Despite the doctrinal innovations of the AirLand Battle, which recognized the Soviet Army's numerical preponderance could not be dealt with solely through reliance on firepower (as shown by the Israeli experiences during the Yom Kippur War of 1973), the US Army did not embrace the doctrine of maneuver to the same extent as the German or Israeli armies. In spite of its highly effective performance during Operation Desert Storm, the US Army did not display the sort of emphasis on speed, even at the cost of risking exposed flanks or bypassed enemy units, preferring instead to rely on a more methodical, phaseline-governed advance that maximized the impact of its considerable firepower. While this approach proved extremely effective against the Iraqi forces, it (along with political decision making) contributed to some Iraqi Republican Guard units escaping to Iraq, where they helped to put down 1991 uprisings in Iraq.
The US Army's emphasis on firepower was reflected by the greater concentration of resources at division, as opposed to brigade, levels. Artillery is generally "attached" no lower than brigade brigade. It is very common for the division HQ to attach one battalion of howitzers to each maneuver brigade.The brigade commander may then assign some of his artillery to "Direct Support" for some of his battalions, generally by battery. Direct Support means that the artillery is specifically tasked to fire in close support for that particular subunit.
While maneuver-oriented militaries have tended to make their brigades and even battalions more self-sufficient and capable of autonomous operations, the long-standing pro-firepower bias of the US Army manifested itself through centralizing control at divisional level of assets that in other armies were permanent components of brigades. To a certain extent it was due to the magnificent array of weapon systems US divisions had at their disposal, which made them, at least in terms of firepower, more powerful than any equivalent unit in the world. However, it is not a coincidence that armies that embrace maneuver warfare tend to be relatively small forces whose likely foes outnumber and/or outgun them. A trauma of total defeat by a more agile adversary, as in the case of France in 1940, can be a powerful stimulus as well. The US Army has lacked such experiences. In all of its conflicts in the 20th Century, if it did not outnumber its foes it certainly outgunned them. Superior firepower (including in the form of air-delivered ordnance) during World War 2 was more than enough to offset any deficiencies in maneuver.
Nevertheless, although still clinging to the remnants of its attritional way of war that have served it so well during most of the 20th Century, the US Army of the 1980s compared very favorably with that of its likely opponents. Its combination of firepower and maneuver would have likely been sufficient to halt a Soviet offensive.
Firepower availability means US player will have abundance of DPICM if he get some artillery, and from late 1980s will often have more of it available than HE. Air support, in particularly A-10, is very deadly against enemy troop concentrations.
M1 is an excellent tank but early models 105mm gun is simply not enough to fight with latest Soviet tanks on equal footing. Flanking is a necessity. On the other hand, 120mm armed tanks will destroy any enemy armor with ease, but they carry less ammo. That is very important because most of the time, US player will likely play outnumbered.
M2 and M3, albeit very expensive, can be a great tank hunters, provided they can engage targets at long range and these targets don't boast a full suit of ERA.